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IN RE: ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, PALM
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION
If you are a man who has had anonymous sex and are interested in
parenting a child that may have been conceived from this random
union—do not despair, the Florida legislature recently passed a new
adoption law that protects your rights. In March of 2001, the Florida
State Legislature passed sweeping amendments to Florida’s adoption
laws.1 The most controversial of these laws has been named the
“Scarlet Letter” law by many of its opponents.2 In a nutshell, if a
mother who is placing her child for adoption does not know who her
baby’s father is, and she has exhausted avenues of finding him, she
must place a notice in the local newspaper in the county where the
baby was conceived.3 This notice must include her name, a
1. See H.R. 141, 103rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (showing that both houses voted
in March 2001), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm; see also
Shelby Oppel, Senate Okays Adoption Changes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001,
at 1A (listing the new changes, which include giving birth mothers three days to
revoke consent to adoption of a child who is not an infant; requiring a “diligent
search” for birth fathers; and giving birth fathers who claim fraud two years to
challenge an adoption). Other amendments within the bill include the creation of a
forty-eight hour waiting period before a birth mother can release a child for adoption
and preventing courts from finding that a birth father abandoned his child simply
because he did not give the birth mother “emotional support” during her pregnancy.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Al Neuharth, ‘Scarlet’ or Adoption for Unwed Mothers?,
USATODAY.com, Aug. 15, 2002 (arguing that the new Florida law stigmatizes unwed
women or teenage girls who wish to put their child up for adoption as did the fabled
scarlet “A” from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s classic novel), available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/2002-08-15-neuharth_x.htm; Daniel de Vise,
Suit Attacks Adoption Law Requiring Sex Details in Ads, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9,
2002, at 1A (highlighting feminist leaders’ characterization of the new law as “a
humiliation to women everywhere, a modern-day Scarlet Letter”). See generally
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 47-55 (Penguin Books 2003) (1850)
(detailing the public ridicule of Hester Prynne, required by law to wear a red “A”
upon her bosom for the sin of adultery and unwed pregnancy).
3. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (2001) (requiring constructive notice where the
location and identity of the father are unknown); see also Jon Burstein, Moms
Challenge New Adoption Laws; Women Fear Ads Naming Sex Partners, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL (Palm Beach County, Fla.), Aug. 7, 2002, at 1A (noting that when
background searches are unsuccessful, the birth mother must place notice in the
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description of herself, a name and/or description of the possible
father, the date and the city or county of conception.4
The law, which took effect in October 2001,5 has been highly
controversial.6 One critic stated “it invades privacy and brands
women with a ‘scarlet letter’ by making them divulge embarrassing
intimate sexual details.”7 This same opponent even hypothesized
what an “ad” in the newspaper would look like: “Jane Smith, 31,
brown hair, brown eyes, seeking 30-something man, blond hair, blue
eyes, mole on right cheek, who spent last Nov. 20 in Rural Route 44
motel after drinks at sports bar next door. May have fathered child.”8
Regardless, proponents of the new law say it provides finality to
adoption proceedings.9 Another supporter believes that this law
finally acknowledges “the problem birth fathers nationwide face in
preventing adoptions that they don’t want or, in many cases, don’t
even know are happening.”10
Governor Jeb Bush, in an unsigned letter to the legislature, also
entered into the debate, supporting the bill because it would increase
the finality of adoptions.11 He stated that he recognizes the law may
newspaper).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5).
5. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087, 63.088.
6. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 3 (noting that legislators were aware at the time
of passage that the bill would probably attract attention, particularly from adoption
attorneys).
7. Geraldine Sealey, Florida’s ‘Scarlet Letter’: Controversial Adoption Law Pits
Women’s Privacy, Fathers’ Rights, ABCNEWS.com, Aug. 20, 2002 (comparing critics
who find the law “an anachronistic injustice,” with supporters who welcome the
“attempt to secure paternal privileges.”), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/
DailyNews/fathersrights 020820.html.
8. Id.
9. See Juleyka Lantigua, Progressive Media Project, Florida Adoption Law
Humiliates Women, Aug. 28, 2002 (quoting Senator Walter Campbell, who stated
that without the law, “we have potential biological fathers coming back and taking
children out of adoptive parents’ hands”), available at http://www.progressive.org/
Media%20Project%202/mpla2802.html.
See generally de Vise, supra note 2
(quoting Senator Campbell as stating that the intent behind the bill was “to prevent
disruptive legal attacks from biological fathers after an adoption is final, not to subject
mothers to public humiliation”).
10. Jeffrey Leving, New Adoption Law Correctly Requires Mothers to Publish
Sexual Pasts, Says Fatherhood Educational Institute, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 13, 2002
(commending the Florida legislature and Governor Jeb Bush for acknowledging birth
fathers’ rights), available at http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/search5/0813139.html. Leving argues that adoption laws should not ignore biological fathers’
rights “simply because it’s more convenient.” Id.
11. See Unsigned Letter from Governor Jeb Bush, State of Florida, to Secretary
Katherine Harris 1 (Apr. 17, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Unsigned
Letter] (“House Bill 141 begins with the premise that we should bring more certainty
to Florida’s adoption procedures and laws. This certainty is designed to provide
greater finality once the adoption is approved, and to avoid circumstances where
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not be perfect;12 however, Governor Bush rationalized the adoption
bill by discussing the need to balance the rights of three interested
parties: “the birth mother, the birth father, and the adoptive
parents.”13 He also noted the state’s responsibility to ensure “the
child’s safety, well-being, and permanency.”14 Finally, Governor Bush
conceded that the statute “provides some comfort as well as
discomfort for all groups involved in the process.”15
The primary proponent of the bill, Senator Walter Campbell,
brought the legislation forward in order to discourage disruptions in
the adoption process.16 Although there was sparse opposition to the
bill, opponents were adamant that there were inherent problems with
the new procedures.17 The bill ultimately passed both houses of the
Florida legislature with ease,18 and the unsigned letter from Governor
Bush was attached to the bill when it was adopted.19
The most important debate on the law has taken place in a Palm
Beach County Court. On May 20, 2002, attorneys Charlotte Danciu
and Lynn G. Waxman filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment,
challenging the constitutionality of Florida Statute sections 63.087
and 63.088.20 The Motion challenged the Florida laws as a violation
future challenges to the adoption disrupt the life of the child.”).
12. See id. at 3-4 (quoting Ben Franklin at the constitutional convention stating:
“I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the convention who may still
have objections to it would with me on this occasion doubt a little of his own
infallibility. . . .”).
13. Id. at 1. But see Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So. 2d 565, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(Polston, J., dissenting) (identifying the three parties who can claim “competing
constitutional interests” in an adoption battle between adoptive parents and a
maternal grandmother as the adoptive parents, birth mother and child).
14. Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1. See generally Ramey v. Thomas, 382 So.
2d 78, 80-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that in all proceedings regarding child
custody, the “best-interest and welfare of the child” must be the primary focus).
15. Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1.
16. See de Vise, supra note 2.
17. See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Bill Posey, who stated: “I just
truly and in my heart think we’re going in the wrong direction. . . .”).
18. See H.R. 141, 103rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (showing the vote: the House of
Representatives voted 104 to eight in favor of the bill and the Senate voted thirty to
eight in favor of the bill).
19. See id; see also Oppel, supra note 1 (explaining that Governor Bush had
seven days after the passage of the bill to veto, sign, or allow it to become law without
his signature—he chose the last option.)
20. Pl’s. Mot. for Declaratory J. at 1, In re: Adoption of a Minor (citation omitted)
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002) (docket no. omitted) (redacted version on file with author)
[hereinafter Motion] (contending that the required publication violates both the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, section 23 of
the Florida Constitution). Information about the law offices of Charlotte H. Danciu,
located in Boca Raton, Florida, is available at http://www.adoption-surrogacy.com/
aboutus.htm.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the Florida Constitution.21
Interestingly, the Florida Attorney
General opted not to defend the statute in question.22 On July 24,
2002, Circuit Court Judge Peter D. Blanc issued an Order that
partially granted, but mainly denied plaintiffs’ Motion.23 The
following is an analysis of the Florida Adoption law and the Fifteenth
Circuit’s holding.
I.

FLORIDA ADOPTION LAW

The Florida Adoption Act requires a petition and hearing to
terminate the parental rights by both the biological mother and
father before the adoption.24 Under the amended law, if the father is
unknown or cannot be located at the time of the petition, the mother
must publish a petition and notice of hearing in the newspaper in
“each city in which the mother resided or traveled, in which
conception may have occurred, during the 12 months before the
minor’s birth.”25
Section 63.088 sets forth requirements for notice, service, and the
diligent search of a biological father, in order to terminate his
parental rights.26 If these inquiries fail to illuminate a birth father’s
identity, a notice must be published in the newspaper.27 According to
the new amendments,28 this notice must contain:
21. See id. at 5-6 (illustrating the similarities in the right to privacy articulated in
the federal and Florida constitutions); see also infra Part III.
22. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Mot. to Declare Florida
Statute Sections 63.087 and 63.088 Unconstitutional at 1, In re: Adoption of a Minor
Child (citation omitted) (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002) (docket no. omitted) (redacted version
on file with author) [hereinafter Order] (noting that the state did not respond to the
plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment); see also Jane Sutton, Sex History Law
Looks Set to Be Dumped, REUTERS, Feb. 20, 2003 (explaining that, on appeal,
Attorney General Charles Crist would not defend the adoption statute, as passage of
the bill and the Circuit Court’s decision took place before he came into office), at
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=oddlyEnoughNew&storyID=226048;
see also id. (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Danciu stating: “It speaks loudly . . . that the
attorney general’s office doesn’t believe this statute is worth defending.”).
23. Order, supra note 22, at 19-20.
24. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087 (2001) (setting forth the administrative procedures
and outlining the contents of a petition to terminate parental rights); see also Order,
supra note 22, at 4 (describing the required procedure of termination of parental
rights prior to the filing of an adoption petition).
25. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087(b)(f). See, e.g., Example Petition and Notice for Filing
in Local Newspaper (on file with author).
26. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(2), (4) (2002) (including procedures that apply
when the father’s location and identity are known and unknown).
27. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5).
28. See generally de Vise, supra note 2 (noting that the previous adoption law
required a much simpler notice to unknown fathers, including only the baby’s date
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[A] physical description including, but not limited to, age, race,
hair and eye color, and approximate height and weight of the
minor’s mother and of any person the mother reasonably believes
may be the father, the minor’s date of birth; and any date and city,
including the county and state in which the city is located, in which
conception may have occurred.29

Before a court will proceed with the termination of parental rights
and the adoption, an affidavit of constructive service must be filed
with the court.30 To achieve constructive service as required by the
statute,31 the above information must be published in the county
where the court is located once a week for four consecutive weeks.32
II. PLAINTIFFS
The constitutional challenge was brought on behalf of six plaintiffs.
In the Order, the court explains each plaintiff’s factual scenario:
[A] is a [minor] child33 who was raped by an adult male of
approximately twenty seven years of age. The male’s name is
known, but his whereabouts are unknown to the birthmother, as
well as the police. The mother gave birth to a child and wishes to
place him for adoption. Sections 63.087 and 63.088 requires
publication of the child/victim’s name in the newspaper for the
adoption to be completed;

and place of birth).
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (requiring that unknown or unascertainable facts be
indicated within the notice petition). See generally Motion, supra note 20, at 6-7
(noting that FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 sets forth strict confidentiality requirements in
adoption proceedings). However, under the 2001 amendments, these requirements
were waived for information required in Section 63.088. Id. at 7.
30. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(2) (2001) (“Before the court may determine that a
minor is available for adoption . . . each person whose consent is required . . . must be
personally served.”); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (stating that “the unlocated or
unidentified person must be served notice under subsection (2) by constructive
service”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.089(2)(d) (West 2003) (“The court may hold the
hearing [to terminate the father’s rights] only when . . . all affidavits of inquiry,
diligent search, and service required under section 63.088 have been obtained and
filed with the court.”).
See, e.g., Aff. of Don Morgan, Legal Advertising
Representative at 1 (Jul. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (attaching an actual
advertisement that ran in the Tallahassee Democrat).
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 49.011(10) (West 2003).
32. FLA. STAT. ch. 49.011(10), 49.10(1).
33. Depending upon the Florida statute involved, a minor may be under the age
of sixteen or eighteen. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2001) (defining a
minor as a person who is sixteen or seventeen years old), with FLA. STAT. ANN. §
800.04 (West 2003) (criminalizing lewd conduct with persons under sixteen years
old).
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[B] is a [minor] child34 who now resides . . . in Florida . . . and had
sexual relations with numerous classmates. Subsequently, she gave
birth to an infant . . . and placed her for adoption with family
friends. Sections 63.087 and 63.088 require publication of the
minor’s name, description, location of conception and
circumstances of conception in [B’s] hometown newspaper to
effectuate notice to a possible birth father;
[C] is a single woman in her late twenties. She has had an on again,
off again drug problem. During a period of ‘using’ she had sexual
relations with other drug users. She has no idea of the identity or
whereabouts of the possible father. She subsequently entered
rehab and gave birth to a drug free baby. She is working. She
wishes for her child to be adopted. Sections 63.087 and 63.088
require [C’s] name, description and the whereabouts and
circumstances of conception to be published in the newspaper;
[D] is a single woman in her twenties and a former foster child. . . .
She has had numerous35 sex partners and has an alcohol abuse
problem. She is currently working.
[E] is a single woman in her thirties. . . . She alleges she was slipped
a ‘date rape’ drug at a bar and was assaulted by three unknown
men. Sections 63.087 and 63.088 require publication of her name,
description, location of conception and circumstances of
conception in the newspaper;
[F] is a single mother . . . in her thirties who has a substance abuse
problem. While ‘using’ she had sexual relations with a number of
drug ‘dealers.’ She conceived a child but does not know the
identity or whereabouts of the birth father. Sections 63.087 and
63.088 require publication of her name description, location of
conception and circumstances of conception in newspaper. . . .36

34. Although the Order on file is a redacted version, later news publications
indicate that the minor in scenario “[B]” was thirteen years of age. See Court to Hear
Challenge to Florida’s ‘Scarlet Letter Law,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at A25
[hereinafter Court to Hear Challenge] (explaining that the appellate court will hear
the case brought by various plaintiffs, one of which is “a girl who had sex with several
classmates and conceived at age 13. . . .”).
35. As in the case of scenario “B”, although the Order on file was a redacted
version, later news publications indicate that this plaintiff has slept with seven men
and has no idea who the father might be. See Sutton, supra note 22 (quoting
plaintiffs’ attorney Charlotte Danciu).
36. Order, supra note 22, at 2-3.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Plaintiffs challenged the statute as a violation of their federal right
to privacy and their right to be free from government intrusion in
personal matters.37 This right has been interpreted to encompass and
protect “fundamental interests in marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships and rearing of children.”38
Further, the State of Florida has explicitly provided additional privacy
protection within its constitution.39
According to the Florida
Constitution, “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life as
otherwise provided herein.”40 Florida courts interpret this language
to include the right to make personal decisions such as whether to
have an abortion and how to raise children.41
In order to bring a challenge to a Florida statute as a violation of
the state constitution, the plaintiff must first have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the matters under dispute.42 The state then
has the burden of demonstrating that the statute “serves a compelling

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . .”). See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing for the first time
that the right to privacy extends to matters surrounding an individual’s intimate
relationships); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is
the right to be free . . . from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(highlighting the right to privacy in matters of intimate sexual behavior); Lawrence v.
Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 26, 2003) (overruling Bowers and
declaring that no legitimate state interest can “justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.”).
38. Motion, supra note 20, at 5. See e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (noting that decisions regarding such personal decisions are
protected and the government must not interfere without a justified reason).
39. See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998) (noting that the Florida
“constitutional right to privacy is much broader in scope, embraces more privacy
interests, and extends more protection . . . than its federal counterpart”).
40. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (added 1980, amended 1998).
41. See Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 516-17 (upholding the parental right to decide
whether to allow grandparent visitations); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195
(Fla. 1989) (upholding a minor’s right to decide whether to have an abortion without
first having to obtain her parents’ consent).
42. See, e.g., Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla.
1985) (determining whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy by
analyzing whether the law reasonably recognizes an “individual’s legitimate
expectation of privacy in financial institution records”).
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state interest.”43 Finally, the state must prove that it “accomplishes its
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”44
IV. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
As an introduction to its holding, the court outlined the State of
Florida’s role as the “final guarantor[] of personal privacy.”45 The
court noted that Florida’s constitution “embraces more privacy
interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those
interests, than does the federal Constitution.”46
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In their Motion for Declaratory Judgment, plaintiffs identified two
distinct areas in which women have a reasonable and justified
expectation of privacy. First, plaintiffs argued that in cases of sexual
battery, information about the victim should be strictly confidential.47
Second, plaintiffs argued that all information regarding adoptions is
also strictly confidential.48
The court agreed, extending the
fundamental and personal right of child rearing as defined in Y.H. v.
F.L.H.,49 to the right to make decisions regarding adoption of a
child.50 This was not a difficult decision; the right to privacy in
personal matters is well established.

43. See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and In re Estate of
Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980)).
44. Id.
45. Order, supra note 22, at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 35051 (1967)).
46. Id. at 8 (citing Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 544); see also id. (boasting that Florida
is one of only four states, including Alaska, California, and Montana, to specifically
guarantee the right to privacy within its state constitution).
47. Motion, supra note 20, at 7 (indicating that there are criminal penalties for a
newspaper if it publishes an assault victim’s name); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03
(West 2003) (criminalizing the publication of any information that identifies the
victim of a sexual offense).
48. Motion, supra note 20, at 7-8.
49. 784 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
50. Order, supra note 22, at 11 (“Clearly, there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding these [adoption] matters.”); see also Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood
Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing that Supreme Court
precedent encompasses autonomy and the right to make certain decisions).
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B. Compelling State Interest
The second determination by the court was whether a compelling
state interest was served by the statutes in question.51 The court
found that the goal of the statutes was to “provide notice to biological
fathers so that they may both exercise their rights and accept their
responsibilities with respect to their biological children. . . .”52 It is
unclear how the court developed this interpretation of the statute.
Yet from this goal, the court then identified two “compelling state
interests”:
First, there would certainly be a compelling state interest in
strengthening and maintaining the bond between parent and child.
Second, in those instances where the biological mother would need
financial assistance from the state due to lack of support from the
biological father, the notice provisions of the aforementioned
statutes would reduce the financial burden on the state in each
instance where a biological father comes forward and accepts his
responsibility for financial support of the minor child.53

Unfortunately, the Court provided no further explanation of why it
identified only these two particular interests. Further, the Court did
not discuss the plaintiffs’ Motion arguing that the compelling state
interest in this matter should be the “necessity to provide an
unidentified and unlocated father with notice . . . [and] to protect the
father’s state and federal constitutional right in determining the care
and upbringing of his children free from governmental
interference.”54
The compelling interests stated in the Judge’s Order are
inapplicable to the situation at issue. For example, the unknown
father, whose rights this law protects, may have had anonymous sex
with a woman while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.55 Do we
want to encourage this type of non-deliberate conception of children
by protecting the biological father’s rights? Further, would a man
who has decided to have anonymous sex with a woman be interested
in parenting a child from that interaction?

51. Order, supra note 22, at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Motion, supra note 20, at 8 (citing the Florida House of Representatives’
Committee on Judicial Oversight Analysis).
55. See Order, supra note 22, at 2-3 (noting that in at least three of the six
plaintiffs’ scenarios, drugs or alcohol was involved before sex).
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Then, in the second interest, there is no need for the biological
father to decrease the financial burden of the biological mother, who
is giving the child up for adoption.56 If the biological father wishes to
oppose the adoption, there is a strong possibility he would receive
custody.57 If the goal of the statutes is to give biological fathers the
opportunity to exercise their parental rights,58 then surely a more
reasonable compelling interest would be as plaintiffs stated, to give
unknowing fathers the opportunity to parent their children.59
However, the court did not discuss this in its opinion.
Next, the court determined that the compelling state interests were
not met in cases involving forced sexual battery.60 The court held
that there is no compelling state interest justifying the publication
requirements when conception was the result of non-consensual
criminal conduct such as sexual battery or rape, with the exception of
“sexual battery of a consensual nature where the crime is based only
on the age of the victim.”61 To make this determination, the court
cites various cases and other state statutes that preclude paternal
rights and adoption challenges in instances of rape.62 Although the
court extensively reviewed the statutory and forced rape laws both in

56. See id. at 11 (stating that there was a compelling interest to require biological
fathers to become involved, in order that they would take responsibility for their
offspring).
57. This statement is based on the assumption that the mother who already wishes
to give her child up for adoption would not change her mind if the biological father
suddenly came forward.
58. Compare Order, supra note 22, at 11 (stating that the goal of the Florida
Adoption law is to give biological fathers the opportunity to exercise their rights or
become responsible for their offspring), with Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1
(stating that the goal of Florida Adoption Act is to encourage finality in the adoption
process).
59. If giving biological fathers the opportunity to parent were a reasonable
“compelling state interest,” it would certainly fail to be the least intrusive means
available. In the case in which the father is completely unknown—in other words, he
participated in a completely anonymous sexual encounter—it is unreasonable to
think that he is looking to be a father, much less that he should receive constitutional
protection.
60. See Order, supra note 22, at 14-15 (finding no compelling interest justifying
the statutes’ publication requirements where the child was conceived out of “forced”
or “non-consensual battery”).
61. See id. at 17 (distinguishing between two categories of cases: those that
involve forced sexual battery; and those that either do not involve sexual battery, or
that only involve sexual battery “of a consensual nature” based only on the age of the
victim). The court found the state’s interest was not compelling in the first category,
but was sufficiently compelling in the latter. Id.
62. See id. at 15-16 (noting that only a few states automatically terminate rights or
eliminate notice requirements if the child was conceived as a result of sexual assault,
but many states preclude parental rights in instances of violent rape).
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Florida and other jurisdictions, it never rationalized why only the
forced sexual battery scenarios did meet the compelling state interest
test.
C. Least Intrusive Means
The third section of the Order discussed whether the statute was
the least intrusive means available. The court first states that “[t]he
right to privacy in adoption in all aspects of an adoption proceedings
[sic] is, thus, well established in this State.”63 The court ultimately
holds that it “cannot find that the existing publication requirements
contained within sections 63.087 and 63.088 do not accomplish their
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”64 Aside from the
negative affirmative, the court’s holding is ambiguous because it bases
its decision merely on the fact that there is no data or statistics on the
success or failure rate of the notice requirements.65 The court did
note that there was no evidence that the statutes were accomplishing
the goals set forth above, but it refused to hold the statutes
unconstitutional, without further evidence that less intrusive means
would accomplish these goals.66
Unfortunately, the court suffers from a lack of creativity. One
potentially less intrusive method of achieving the same goal would be
a putative father registry.67 In fact, Senator Walter Campbell, the
law’s primary sponsor, recently proposed such a registry for the State
of Florida.68 Furthermore, it is possible that the needs of putative
63. Id. at 18. See also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989);
Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 1987); Winfield v.
Div. Of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
64. Order, supra note 22, at 19 (holding that it “cannot find that the existing
publication requirements contained within sections 63.087 and 63.088 do not
accomplish their goal through the use of the least intrusive means”). But see de Vise,
supra at note 2 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Charlotte Danciu who stated “[t]here’s so
much potential harm that can come from this, and there are so many less intrusive
ways of getting the message out. . . .”).
65. Order, supra note 22, at 19 (mentioning that there are other less intrusive
means, such as only publishing initials of birth mothers, but disregarding these
possibilities because “there is no data to establish that these alternative methods
would be more or less effective than the existing notice requirements”).
66. Id.
67. “Putative father” has been defined as “a man who may be a child’s father, but
who was not married to the child’s mother before the child was born and has not
established the fact that he is the father in a court proceeding.” 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 50/12.1 (West 2003) (authorizing the Department of Children and Family
Services to establish a putative father registry); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/12a (West 2003) (delineating the type of notice that must be given to putative
fathers). In fact, this has been recently proposed as a revision to the Florida statute.
See S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003).
68. See S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003). The bill creates a new section
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fathers were not being met under the previous system, which merely
required publishing the child’s date and place of birth.69 Although
the “old” system may not have worked particularly well in cases in
which the father is an ex-boyfriend, it is most likely at least as
ineffective in the anonymous sexual partner situation.
V. IMPLICATIONS
As Judge Blanc stated in his Order, there really is no concrete
statistical data available on the effectiveness of these statutes.70
However, anecdotal predictions abound. “Adoption attorneys blame
the law for a 17 percent decrease in adoptions statewide for the first
half of 2002.”71 According to Charlotte Danciu, attorney for
plaintiffs, many of her clients would and have had abortions, rather
than go through the humiliating process of publishing their sexual
history as required by this law.72 One client even told Danciu she
“would have killed herself,” before publishing one of the notice
petitions.73
VI. THE APPEAL
After the Order was issued, plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth District
Court of Appeals.74 Oral arguments were held on February 20,
2003.75 The Attorney General of Florida “intentionally failed to file a
contesting brief”76 and the state’s lawyers refused to appear to defend
the law.77 The Fourth District Court filed a ruling on April 23, 2003,
defining the rights of an “unmarried biological father” and specifically defines the
related compelling state interest as follows:
[A]n unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood . . . [and] the state has a
compelling interest in requiring an unmarried biological father to
demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate medical care and
financial support and by establishing legal paternity rights in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter.
Id.
69. No empirical data was available on this requirement either.
70. Order, supra note 22, at 19.
71. Peter Franceschina, ‘Scarlet Letter’ Law Discussed; State Doesn’t Contest
Adoption Statute Challenge, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2003, at 5B.
72. See Sutton, supra note 22 (stating that Danciu has estimated that about thirty
of her clients have had abortions rather than publish their sexual histories).
73. Id.
74. See Court to Hear Challenge, supra note 34.
75. Id.
76. G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
77. See Florida Court Strikes Down Adoption Posting Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
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finding the statutes under the Florida Adoption Act
unconstitutional.78 The Court struck down the challenged sections
63.087 and 63.088, deciding that the “offending provisions
substantially interfere” with a woman’s right to choose adoption and
her right not to disclose the intimate details of her personal life that
was required in the notice.79 Moreover, the Court declared that the
state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest that outweighed the
privacy rights of the mother and child to not be described in such a
“personal, intimate, and intrusive manner.”80 Although the Court
reversed the trial court ruling, it did not address any alternative
proposals81 that were raised by the appellants.
However, in accord with the judgment, lawmakers unanimously
passed a bill to establish the “Florida Putative Father Registry.”82 The
bill’s stated purpose is to “preserve the right to notice and consent to
an adoption.”83 The confidential paternity registry requires men to
register with the state if they believe they may be a father.84 The
potential fathers would have to provide the name, address, and
physical description of the mother as well as the date and place where
conception could have taken place.85 Additionally, the men are
notified if a woman they have specifically named in the registry has a
baby up for adoption and a claim of paternity may be filed any time

2003, at A28 [hereinafter Florida Court Strikes Down Law] (reporting that the state’s
lawyers did not agree with the heavily criticized adoption law).
78. See G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1061 (stating that the challenged sections violated the
right to privacy guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Art. I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution).
79. See id. at 1062 (noting that invasion of both of these rights and interests are
“so patent in this instance” that they did not require a case analysis to interpret the
constitutional provision).
80. Id. at 1063
81. See S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003) (introducing, on March 19, 2003
before the judgment was rendered, proposed revisions to the adoption statute that
included the creation of a putative father registry); see also Jerry Berrios, Birth
Mothers Regain Privacy in Adoptions, THE MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 1B
(reporting that Senator Campbell, the primary sponsor of the challenged statutes,
introduced and supported the revisions because he realized that the statutes had
“unintended consequences”).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2003) (detailing actions required by an
unmarried biological father in order to establish parental rights). See, e.g., Lloyd
Dunkelberger, Legislators look to cut ‘Scarlet Letter’ law, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE,
Apr. 13, 2003, at BS1 (providing a thorough explanation about the paternity registry
and statistics of whether the new law will be effective).
83. See § 63.054(1).
84. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0541 (West 2003) (explaining that the information
given by the potential father will be kept by the Office of Vital Statistics in the
Department of Health and is “confidential and exempt from public disclosure”).
85. See § 63.054(3).
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prior to the child’s birth.86 However, potential fathers cannot file
with the registry if the mother has already begun the process to
terminate the father’s parental rights.87
On May 30, 2003, Governor Jeb Bush signed the bill supporting the
paternity registry noting that the bill imposes a certain level of
responsibility on the father.88 After Governor Bush officially repealed
the “Scarlet Letter” law by signing the new bill, Lieutenant Governor
Toni Jennings announced the official demise of the law to the Florida
Adoption Council members, who in response gave a standing
ovation.89
Although the Court’s decision and the lawmakers’ actions came as
little surprise, Florida women expressed a general feeling of
vindication and relief.90 Adoption attorneys and civil rights groups
labeled the appellate decision a “huge victory for women.”91
Moreover, Charlotte Danciu, attorney for the appellants, was ecstatic
with the Court’s decision saying that it was a “great day for adoptions”
and it dissipated the humiliation birth moms were subjected to under
the “Scarlet Letter law.”92

86. See § 63.054(1), (7) (establishing that when a mother begins an adoption
proceeding she must contact and provide the same information requested from the
men to the Office of Vital Statistics allowing the Office to conduct a diligent search of
the registry to find a possible match for a father).
87. See § 63.054(1).
88. See Randolph Pendleton, Bush Signs Bill Repealing ‘Scarlet Letter Law,’
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 31, 2003, at B5 (discussing lawmakers’ positive opinions
regarding the paternity registry). Representative Mark Mahon from Jacksonville also
supported the bill saying it puts the responsibility where it should be, the father, who
should volunteer rather than requiring the mother to try to locate someone who may
not want to be found. Id.
89. See Sherri Ackerman, Florida Adoption Officials Applaud Bush Veto of
“Scarlet Letter Law,” TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 31, 2003, at 7 (describing the success and
happiness among adoption officials for the repeal of the “Scarlet Letter law”).
90. See Florida Court Strikes Down Law, supra note 77 (quoting ACLU attorney,
Mariann Wang, expressing, “A lot of women’s lives and children’s lives have been on
hold for all this time, so it’s a wonderful thing that women’s rights have finally been
vindicated and protected.”).
91. See Susan Spencer-Wendel, Court: Moms Needn’t List Partners to Pick
Adoption, THE PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 24, 2003, at 1A (indicating that the “Scarlet
Letter law” had a “chilling effect” and only served to humiliate women).
92. See Berrios, supra note 81 (noting the elated reactions from various
lawmakers and adoption officials about the repeal of the law); see also supra notes 7273 and accompanying text (explaining the embarrassment women faced with the
choice that they must publish their intimate personal information).
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CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of adoption laws is not to find babies for
parents who want them but rather to locate stable homes for children
while still protecting the rights of every party involved. The paternity
registry gives lawmakers a second chance to protect the mother’s
privacy, preserve a father’s parental claims, and maintain the adoptive
parents’ rights to care for a child. Further, the bill allows Florida to
effectuate useful adoption laws and closes an embarrassing chapter in
the state’s legislative history. However, regardless of the final
outcome, it is frustrating that lawmakers are willing to deprive women
of the right to privacy in matters as personal as sexual experiences.
Finally, it is disturbing that in the year 2003, lawmakers are willing to
cast the same sort of wrath and humiliation on unwed mothers that
the Puritans cast on Hester Prynne in The Scarlet Letter, written in
1850.93
JENNAFER NEUFELD
DALIA GEORGI

93. See HAWTHORNE, supra note 2, at 220-21 (describing the scarlet letter that
Hester Prynne was forced to wear: “[w]herever her walk hath been,—wherever, so
miserably burdened, she may have hoped to find repose,—it hath cast a lurid gleam
of awe and horrible repugnance roundabout her.”).
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